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Abstract
We propose an extended spatial evolutionary public goods game (SEPGG)
model to study the dynamics of individual career choice and the correspond-
ing social output. Based on the social value orientation theory, we categorized
two classes of work, namely the public work if it serves public interests, and
the private work if it serves personal interests. Under the context of SEPGG,
choosing public work is to cooperate and choosing private work is to defect.
We then investigate the effects of employee productivity, human capital and
external subsidies on individual career choices of the two work types, as well
as the overall social welfare. From simulation results, we found that when em-
ployee productivity of public work is low, people are more willing to enter the
private sector. Although this will make both the effort level and human capital
of individuals doing private work higher than those engaging in public work, the
total outcome of the private sector is still lower than that of the public sector
provided a low level of public subsidies. When the employee productivity is
higher for public work, a certain amount of subsidy can greatly improve system
output. On the contrary, when the employee productivity of public work is low,
provisions of subsidy to the public sector can result in a decline in social output.
Keywords: career choice, spatial evolutionary game theory, public goods
game, social welfare
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1. Introduction
Career choice is an important research topic that has drawn attentions
mostly from the psychology community. The most widely used models consider
three factors in the decision-making process of a career choice: The intrinsic
factor of personal interests and job satisfaction, the extrinsic factor of job avail-
ability and scope of occupation, and the interpersonal factor of influences from
friends, family and society [1, 2]. The complexity of a career-choosing process is
reflected by the interplay of two mechanisms, one that justifies the suitability of
a person to the target career based on working skills, abilities, characteristics,
and interests, and one that is driven by external environment conditions [3].
To this end, career choice study has been divided into two camps. The first
camp focuses on individual’s internal factors such as needs, motivations, values,
abilities and personality, whose principles and research methods are well known
in psychology [4, 5, 6, 7]. The second camp marries psychology to statistics and
data science to equate career choice with person-job matching problem, and the
individual psychological differences are only included as subjective and objec-
tive conditions [8, 9, 10]. Without belittling the progresses made so far, over
the last few decades, we have witnessed an unfolding pattern of career choice
study to include more and more subtle dimensions (see [11] and the references
therein).
In parallel to the study of career choice, researchers in social psychology have
made much progresses in understanding the common natures across societies
and cultures, which leads to the birth of The Theory of Basic Human Values
[12]. In The Theory of Basic Human Values, ten universal values organized
into four groups: openness to change, self enhancement, conservation and self-
transcendence. In 2012, Schwartz expanded the basic individual values into a
set of 19 elements [13]. Undoubtedly, values play an essential role in a person’s
career choice. Many empirical studies have suggested that one is more likely
to choose a career that matches his/her personal values [14, 15]. The study of
human values has led us to a modular way of looking at career choice. If data-
centric method is the key to resolving the job availability and scope problem,
career choice can be simplified as a social value orientation (SVO) problem [16].
In SVO, people can be classified into two groups, the proself/egoistic group and
the prosocial/altruistic group. The proself person maximizes their own gains
and the prosocial person help others by sharing their gains with the society.
Now that the driving force for a career choice has been attributed to a
person’s value orientation, it is natural to study the pathway of the formation
of human values. Much like a successful career choice will bestow a person
benefits like promotion, salary increase and social achievement, an unsuccessful
work transition will discourage a person in making similar changes in the future.
This is not only true to the experiencing person, but to the witnesses. This
phenomenon can be summarized by the social learning theory (SLT) due to
Bandura’s orignal work [17] and extensions [18]. In SLT, learning requires social
context, information flow, cognition, behaviour changes and reinforcement. The
most prominent feature is that people imitates others’ behaviours by modelling
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its performance in a predictive fashion. In the context of career choice, SLT
offers a framework to modelling the propagation of human values. For example,
many people are interested in serving the public to increase others’ well-being.
But working in the public service sector and donating to a charity are two
different ways of helping others [19]. Studies show that different social context
yields different altruistic behaviours, possibly explained by SLT.
Other than the socio-psychological way of studying the impacts of human
values on career choice, we can quantitatively study the dynamics of the ca-
reer changing behaviours. A complex physical system can better characterize
the interactions between individuals or groups as a Public Goods Game (PGG)
[20]. In a PGG, public goods such as social benefit systems or the environment
are particularly prone to be exploited by individuals at the expense of others.
Analogous to the famous prisoners dilemma that focuses on the human pair-
wise interactions, PGG studies behaviours involving multiple players. Among
the players, cooperators contribute a cost to the public pool, while defectors
contribute nothing. The total contribution is multiplied by a factor reflecting
a synergetic effects of cooperation. Then the resulting reward is equally redis-
tributed to all players, regardless their strategies. Experiment shows that, for
a well-mixed population, defectors will dominate the whole game if the synergy
factor is less than the total number of players [21]. The collective free-riding
behaviours of defectors would result in “tragedy of the commons” [22].
Recently, there are two practical extensions to PGG. Firstly, spatial struc-
tures have been considered in the study of game strategies, i.e., lattice or densely
connected networks [23]. Secondly, the evolution of game dynamics has been
included to study the critical points or phase transition of PGG [24]. Spatial
evolutionary PGG (SEPGG) has become a powerful framework to study games
[25, 26]. Not only fruitful theoretical results have been published [27, 28, 29, 30],
but many attempts have studied issues like social dilemma [31]. Not surprisingly,
factors like punishment [32, 33], diversity [34, 35, 36], volunteering [37, 38],and
reputation mechanism [39, 40] have been found to play an important role in pro-
moting cooperative behaviours in SEPGG. However, most existing researches
are still based on toy model like two-player games and they are rarely applicable
to real-world problems.
In this paper, we inherit the SEPGG model to study the career choice prob-
lem. To reflect on the intrinsic differences among job candidates, the job output
is characterized by a multiplication of human capital, employee productivity
and personal effort. For the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality,
we narrow down the career choices into value orientations of two distinct types
of works, the one serving public interests (public work) and the one serving
personal interests (private work). In reference to the PGG model, choosing a
public work is to cooperate and choosing a private work is to defect. A further
extension is also made to include subsidy effect into our model. Due to the
agent-level modelling capability, our extended SEPGG lays down the founda-
tion to study stable patterns and emergent behaviours of a career choice process
from a complex system perspective [41]. To be specific, our computational ex-
periments study the influences of employee productivity and external subsidy
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on the welfare of the overall system. Our best effort of literature search shows
that this work is the first attempt to study the career choice problem using an
extended SEPGG model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our
extended SEPGG model and the game dynamics. In Section 3, numerical sim-
ulations are conducted thoroughly and the simulation results are analyzed. Fi-
nally, conclusions are provided in Section 4.
2. Model
As mentioned in Section 1, our model assumes two distinct types of career
choice: the public work, whose values are serving public interests, and the private
work, whose values are serving personal interests. The two types are denoted by
P and R respectively. For a type-P work, a person contributes to the common
pool and every player in the game benefits. For a type-R work, a person only
contributes to his/her own welfare and no other player benefits. In our model, a
person i can choose between a public work (si = P ) and a private work(si = R).
2.1. Employee productivity, human capital and work effort
To decide upon how much a worker can produce, next we will introduce
three factors, namely the employee productivity, the human capital and the
work effort, elaborated as follows:
• Employee productivity: Employee productivity is represented by rR for
private work and rP for public work, respectively. The value of employee
productivity provides a measure of work efficiency at an individual level.
Given other factors fixed, a higher employee productivity implies a greater
output of the work, no matter it is type-P or type-R.
• Human capital: Human capital aggregates many personal attributes of
a person, including knowledge, skills, personality, and creativity, into an
economic metric. A higher human capital generally promises a higher
output of individual labour. The human capital of person j is denoted
as γj ∈ [0, 1]. Although human capital can be improved in one’s career,
mainly through education and training, it is assumed to be unchanged in
each instance of our experiment.
• Work effort: In addition to choosing the type of work, a person can also
decide on the level of effort, expressed by ej ∈ [0, 1] for person j. When
ej = 0, it means that the person is accepted by the job, however, he/she
has not put in any effort. On the contrary, when ej = 1, it means that
the person will devote his/her best effort to the job.
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2.2. Work output, utility, and subsidy effect
For the j-th person making career choice of a type-P work, his/her work
output is the multiplication of human capital γj , employee productivity rP ,
and work effort ej , expressed by γjrP ej . The altruistic nature of type-P work
makes this person a cooperator in the SEPGG. Let us define Nj as the closed
neighbourhood of person j, i.e., Nj , N(j) ∪ j. Following the output allocation
strategy in an SEPGG, this output will be equally shared among all neigh-
bouring person N(j), in addition to the j-th person. Therefore, for any person
i ∈ Nj , his/her utility due to the work output of person j can be expressed as
ui←j =
γjrP ej
|Nj | ,∀i ∈ Nj , (1)
where |Nj | denotes the size of person j’s closed neighbourhood.
It is noteworthy to mention that i = j is not excluded in Eqn. (1), which
means that person j also benefits from his/her own work output, equally as
other neighbours.
The output for a type-R work follows a similar definition, given as γjrRej
for the j-th person. The only difference is that the employee productivity has
been replaced by rR. Since it is the nature of a type-R work to defect in the
SEPGG, the utility function of a person i ∈ Nj will be mostly zero other than
that i = j, that is
ui←j =
{
γjrRej , if i = j
0, otherwise.
(2)
Having defined the utility function for all person in our game, the total return
of the i-th person in the SEPGG can be calculated by the following summation,
oi =
∑
j∈Ni
ui←j , (3)
where the utility function for i ∈ Nj is chosen from either Eqn. (1) or Eqn. (2)
depending on person i’s career-choosing strategy.
Additionally, we add subsidy effect to our model to reflect on incentives from
external environment toward the type-P work. The total return for person i is
as follows,
ui =
{
oi + h, if si = P
oi, if si = R
(4)
where h is the external subsidy to incentivize people to serve the public. Like-
wise, it can also be understood as a utility value obtained by the altruistic
preferences of individuals engaged in public service work [19].
Finally, the net output of the entire system (excluding subsidy) is as follows,
o =
∑
i∈Ω
ui←j (5)
where Ω represents the set of all players in the game. The system output can
be considered as the social welfare.
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2.3. Game dynamics
In our extended SEPGG model, each person plays a game with his/her
neighbours using a strategy similar to the standard PGG. We adopt the spatial
structure of a two-dimensional square lattice with periodic boundary conditions.
Each site on the lattice is occupied by one person with four neighbours (von
Neumann neighbourhood). Accordingly, each person belongs to maximally five
different groups. For the i-th person, his/her strategy is executed by controlling
two factors: the work type si ∈ {R,P} and the level of work effort ei ∈ [0, 1].
In designing the game dynamics, we employ the core ideas of social learning
theory, that is, a person learns through observations of others’ behaviours and
chooses career that reflect the common social values [18, 42]. Mathematically, we
use Fermi’s rule to update a person’s career choice [43]. When the i-th person
needs to revise his/her strategy, a randomly chosen neighbour j is imitated.
Given the total returns ui and uj of person i and person j at step t according to
Eqn. (4), the probability of person i adopting person j’s strategy at step t+ 1
satisfies the following Fermi-Dirac (F-D) distribution:
wi←j =
1
1 + exp{(ui − uj + τ)/k} , (6)
where τ ≥ 0 is the cost of work transition and k denotes the irrational degree
of individual decision-making. In the F-D distribution, k can be considered as
a temperature effect. A higher k makes a person irrational in his/her decision-
making. When k > 0, under-performing strategies may also be selected due
to individual mistakes in the observation and evaluation of the utilities. When
k → 0, a person will deterministically follow another person’s strategy.
Next, we discuss two extensions of the game dynamics:
• Work type adoption: When person i’s work type is different from that of
person j, i.e., si(t) 6= sj(t), the work effort of person i remains unchanged
from step t to t + 1, i.e., ei(t + 1) = ei(t). Under such circumstances, si
will be converted to sj with probability wi←j at t+ 1, expressed as,
si(t+ 1) =
{
sj(t), with prob. wi←j in Eqn. (6)
si(t), otherwise.
(7)
• Work effort adoption: When person i and person j have the same work
type at step t, i.e., si(t) = sj(t), there is no need for person i to change
work type at step t + 1, i.e., si(t + 1) = si(t). In imitating person j’s
strategy, the work effort of person i will consequently increase or decrease
depending on if ei(t) is greater or smaller than that of person j. The work
effort adoption dynamics can be characterized as follows,
ei(t+ 1) =
{
m(t+ 1), with prob. wi←j in Eqn. (6)
ei(t), otherwise,
(8)
where m(t + 1) ∼ U(ei(t), 1] if ej(t) > ei(t) and m(t + 1) ∼ U [0, ei(t)) if
ej(t) < ei(t). Here, U [·, ·] represents a uniform distribution.
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Now, we have extended the standard SEPGG to include more realistic dy-
namics, exemplified by a career-choice game. For the special case of rR = 1,
γi = 1 and ei = 1, our extended SEPGG will reduce to a standard SEPGG
model as follows
ui =
{
rPnR/(nP + nR), if si = P
rPnR/(nP + nR) + 1, if si = R,
(9)
where nR and nP are the number of people who choose type-P and type-R
work in person i’s closed neighbourhood, e.g., nP + nR = 5 in our model.
The standard SEPGG has been widely studied as a social dilemma for group
interactions. When rP is relatively small (rP < 5), it is clear that the benefit
of type-R work is always higher than that of type-P work.Therefore, choosing
type-R work is a dominant strategy. The Nash equilibrium of the SEPGG will
be all choose to defect.
3. Simulation results
100 101 102 103 104 105
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0.0
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0.6
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r=6.0
Figure 1: Fraction of type-P work as a function of time step with h = 0 and rP = 4, 5.2, 6.0.
Our simulation is conducted based on the extended SEPGG model described
in Section 2. The spatial structure of the game is a square lattice of 100 by
100. We set k = 0.1 and τ = 0 by assuming no additional cost in the career
transition process [43]. To initialize our game, type-P work and type-R work are
uniformly distributed on the lattice sites. The initial values of human capital
and work effort for each person are drawn from a uniform distribution U [0, 1].
A Monte-Carlo simulation of 5, 000 instances are conducted and the results are
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averaged. To allow for recovery of the system from the initialization shock,
we use a washout time of 55, 000 steps. When we update the strategies for
all participants at any specific time, we use an asynchronous method, which
sequentially chooses a random person to update according to Eqns. (7) and
(8) till all strategies are updated. For simplicity, we assume that the employee
productivity of type-R work to be 1 throughout our experiments, i.e., rR = 1.
Figure 2: Snapshots of SEPGG with h = 0 and rP =4, 5.2 and 6 at t = 10, 100, 500 and
4000. Green color and red color indicates type-P and type-R work respectively.
(1) Three outcomes of a game: all cooperate, all defect, or a mixture
In our model, there are only three possible outcomes: all participants choose
type-P work, all participants choose type-R work, or a mixture of the two.
Figure 1 demonstrates all three cases by plotting the fraction of participants
who chooses type-P work as time evolves. It can be seen that, when simulation
reaches 10, 000 steps, most games approach a stable state. The varying param-
eter is the employee productivity of type-P work, rP . Specifically speaking,
for rP = 4, our model converges to a 100% of type-R work, and for rP = 6,
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every player in our game chooses a type-P work. For the case of rP = 5.2, the
percentage of type-P work fluctuates between 37% and 63%.
To further speculate on the game dynamics, we take snapshots of the game
at different time steps under the same parameter settings of rP . As seen in
Figures 2(1) - 2(4), when rP = 4, more and more participants escape from
type-P work. For rP = 6, the exact opposite pattern can also be observed from
Figures 2(9) - 2(12), where more and more participants choose type-P work till
every player in the game has the same work type. When rP = 5.2, a critical
point has been discovered, as shown by Figures 2(5) - 2(8), that type-P work
and type-R work are still highly mixed after t = 4, 000.
(2) Employee productivity and phase transition
For a thorough study, we first investigate the impact of type-P employee
productivity on the fraction of people who ends up choosing public work. The
results for different settings of subsidy level are shown in Figure 3. When
subsidy h = 0, the system undergoes a phase transition at rP ∈ [5.1, 5.4]. All
individuals choose private work as rP < 5.1 while all individuals choose public
work as rP > 5.4. During the phase-transitioning stage, the system is in a
mixed state of type-P and type-R works. Similar patterns can be observed
with an increasing external subsidy, although phase transition happens at a
reduced level of rP . For example, when h = 0.1, the phase transition occurs
at rP ∈ [3.5, 3.8], and when h = 0.2, it occurs at near rP ∈ [1.7, 2.0]. When
the subsidy level reaches h = 0.3, there are 61% of type-P work in the system
despite of rP = 0. In the case of h = 0.4, regardless of the value of rP , all
participants choose public work.
The results herein show that a person will choose public work only after
his/her productivity reaches a certain value. In addition, external subsidies
incentivize less productive people to switch to type-P work, as we expect. When
the subsidy is large enough, e.g., h = 0.4, all participants choose the type-P
work, even if their productivity is much less than that of the type-R work, that
is, rP  rR.
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Figure 3: Fraction of public work as a function of rP with h = 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4
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Figure 4: Effort as a function of rP for public and private work with h = 0, 0.1, 0.3 and 0.4.
(3) Work effort and human capital
For the next experiment, we study the impact of work effort and human
capital on the social welfare, represented by the system output. Figure 4 shows
that the effort of type-R work is higher than that of type-P work near the phase
transition point. For type-R work, the level of effort almost stays unchanged,
which is ei ≈ 0.6 for si = R. However, the effort of type-P work increases
linearly with rP . The slope of the effort curve is calculated as 0.0075, which can
be observed from Figures 4(1) to 4(4). When h = 0, the phase transition occurs
at rP = 5.2. The work efforts are ei = 0.585 and ei = 0.54 for si = R and si = P
at the phase transition point, respectively. Similarly, the phase transition occurs
at near rP = 3.7 for h = 0.1 and the work efforts are ei = 0.595 and ei = 0.53
for si = R and si = P , respectively. When h = 0.3, the phase transition occurs
at an much earlier point of rP = 0.1 and the level of effort is slightly higher than
0.50 for public work. At last, when the subsidy is as high as 0.4, all participants
leave the type-R work.
So far, we have seen that people in type-R work tend to engage more effort
than people in type-P work. The level of effort of type-P work only increases
linearly with the employee productivity in the public sector, and they never
reach the same level of the private sector.
Furthermore, we examine the relationship between human capital γi and
employee productivity rP . The results are illustrated in Figure 5. When phase
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Figure 5: Work ability as a function of rP for regular and public work with h = 0, 0.1, 0.3
and 0.4.
transition occurs, people with lower human capital remains in the public sector,
and people with higher human capital choose private work. Averagely speaking,
the human capital of type-R work is higher than that of type-P work.
To see how the unsubsidized output of our system changes with employee
productivity, we summarize the previous experiments from another perspective,
as correspondingly shown by pairs of Figures 5(1) with 6(1), Figures 5(2) with
6(2), Figures 5(3) with 6(3), and Figures 5(4) with 6(4). Even if people in the
private sector possess higher human capital and work harder, as evidenced by
Figures 5(1) and 5(2), the system outputs of the public sector are significantly
higher under the circumstances of no or low subsidy, as evidenced by Figures 6(1)
and 6(2). The net output of type-R work is mostly insensitive to the changes
of rP , i.e., o ≈ 0.3. For type-P work, its net output increases proportionally
with rP at a slope of 0.28. However, when the subsidy is very high (h = 0.4), as
shown by Figure 6(4), the phase transition happens at a point of zero employee
productivity in public section (rP = 0). The conclusion follows naturally: public
work can lead to a higher social welfare than private work provided that subsidy
is low.
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Figure 6: Work output as a function of rP for public and private work with h = 0, 0.1,0.3
and 0.4.
(4) Subsidy and social welfare
For our final experiment, we examine the average effort of all participants in
the system and the relationship between the system output and external sub-
sidy. Figure 7(1) shows that the average effort in the entire system decreases
with the amount of external subsidy. The only exception is that, when rP is
very high, e.g., rP = 6, the average effort becomes flat. For rP =4, 2, and 1,
when subsidy increases, the average effort first decreases and then stays at a
level of 0.53, 0.515, and 0.51, respectively. Figure 7(2) plots the relationship be-
tween external subsidy and net system output, or namely social welfare. When
employee productivity in the public sector is relatively large, e.g., rP = 2, 4
or 6, adding subsidy can increase the net output of the system. For example,
when rP = 2, as the subsidy value increases from 0.1 to 0.2, the net output
increases from 0.3 to 0.5. However, when employee productivity in the public
sector is low, e.g., rP = 0.1, 0.5, or 1, adding subsidy can be detrimental to
social welfare. For example, when rP = 0.5, as the subsidy increases from 0.3
to 0.4, the net output drops from 0.3 to 0.1.
Generally speaking, increasing external subsidy can encourage more partic-
ipants to choose public work. However, since work effort of the public sector
is lower than that of the private sector, high level of subsidy will reduce the
overall outcome. On the contrary, the system output of public work is higher
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Figure 7: (1) Effort in the system as a function of h with rP = 0.1, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 4.0 and 6.0.
(2) System output as a function of h with r = 0.1, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 4.0 and 6.0.
than that of private work when rP > rR, and adding subsidy will increase the
net output of the overall system.
4. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we studied the dynamics of people’s career choice from a
perspective of complex system by first extending and then applying the spatial
evolutionary public goods game model. Based on a social value orientation
implication, and for the sake of simplicity, we classified career choices into two
distinctive categories: public work and private work. We also include human
capital, employee productivity and personal effort to examine work output of
both individuals and the system under the impact of different career choices.
To make our model even more practical, we have also included subsidy effect
to incentive people working in the public sector. Major results are found as
followed:
(1) Employee productivity of public work affects the phase transition point of
individual career choices in the absence of external subsidy. When rP is
low, participants gradually migrate to private work. When rP reaches the
vicinity of the phase transition point, the fraction of public workers increases
rapidly until all players in the system resort to public work.
(2) Individuals engaged in private work on average have higher levels of work
effort and human capital than individuals in public work, but public work
can lead to higher social output given that the level of external subsidy is
low. The level of effort of public workers only increases linearly with their
employee productivity.
(3) Level of external subsidies directly affects individual career choices and sys-
tem output. Providing subsidies to public work can attract more workers,
even though they tend to be less productive. However, high level of subsidies
for public work can also reduce individual’s efforts. For public work, under
the conditions of higher employee productivity, more subsidies can increase
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overall system output; under the condition of low employee productivity,
higher level of subsidies will in turn reduce the overall output.
The above findings via our SEPGG model suggest that employee produc-
tivity and the level of external subsidies for public work are crucial factors to
observe individual career choice. To our best knowledge, this study is the first
attempt in modelling the dynamics of career choice as an evolutionary game.
As we will be overwhelmingly seeing the mixed outcome of the game in real life,
this study provides insights to understanding individual career choices from the
perspective of complex system. The preliminary results obtained in this and fu-
ture research can serve as a framework of reference for delicate policy-makings
that are pertinent to setting subsidy levels for public causes and improving
productivity of public workers.
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